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phis & Charleston R. Co. v. Woods, 88 Ala. 630. However, where the wrong was done by the directors in control of the corporation, such a demand and refusal need not be shown in the bill nor proved. *Brewer v. Boston Theater*, 104 Mass. 378; *Rogers v. R. R. Co.*, 91 Fed. 299.

CRIMINAL LAW—ATTEMPT TO COMMIT SUICIDE—INDICTABLE OFFENSE.—MAY V. PENNELL, 64 ATL. 885 (ME.).—*Held*, that in the absence of an express statute, an attempt to commit suicide is not an indictable offense.

This case comes nearer than any decision yet reported in this country directly deciding, on common law grounds, the interesting point involved. Aside from cases construing statutes, *Commonwealth v. Dennis*, 105 Mass. 162, is the only other American case which has dealt with an attempt to commit suicide. That decision, in holding such an attempt not a punishable offense, based its reasoning on the fact that in Massachusetts the whole subject of attempt had been regulated by statute and the common law impliedly repealed. While to some extent analogous to that case, the present decision goes further and virtually holds that, in the absence of a statute, an attempt to commit suicide is not punishable. This view is in conflict with what seems to be the English rule, for, while there have been no authoritative holdings, the two cases in which the question arose clearly enunciate the doctrine that a suicidal attempt is a misdemeanor. *Reg. v. Burgess*, 9 Cox C. C. 247; *Reg. v. Doody*, 6 Cox C. C. 463. So, also, the leading text writers have approved and adopted this view. *Clark's Criminal Law*, 196. *A priori*, it would seem, that, if suicide can be considered a crime, an attempt to commit that crime is punishable. At common law suicide was a crime. 4 Blackstone 190. And, although *Blackburn v. State*, 23 Ohio State 146, is authority to the contrary, recent decisions reiterate this view. *Commonwealth v. Hicks*, 118 Ky. 637; *State v. Levelle*, 34 S. C. 120.

CRIMINAL LAW—MANSLAUGHTER—NEGLIGENCE.—STATE V. MOORE, 106 NORTHWESTERN 16 (IA.).—*Held*, that a conviction for manslaughter should be sustained on facts showing a reckless and negligent indifference to the safety of others, and it is also held that it was unnecessary for the state in order to support a conviction to prove that the deceased person was not guilty of contributory negligence.

CRIMINAL LAW—RIGHT OF MURDERER TO INHERIT FROM VICTIM.—MCALLISTER V. FAIR, 84 PACIFIC 112 (KANSAS).—*Held*, that under a statute of Kansas, providing in clear terms that a husband shall inherit from his deceased wife, and making no exception to the rule, the court is not justified in reading into the statute a clause disinheriting a husband because he feloniously killed his intestate wife for the purpose of acquiring her property.

DIVORCE—CONVICTION OF CRIME—EFFECT OF PARDON.—HALLOWAY V. HALLOWAY, 55 S. E. 191 (KY.).—A statute provides that the conviction of a married person of an offense involving moral turpitude, followed by a sentence in the penitentiary for a term of two years or longer, gives to the other party to the marriage a right to a divorce. The defendant was convicted of such an offense, and, after serving five years in the penitentiary, was pardoned. After the pardon the other party to the marriage brought her bill for divorce. *Held*, that her right to a divorce was not affected by the pardon.

This case is a direct ruling on a hitherto undecided point. The weight of authority upholds the general rule that an absolute pardon relieves the